The Iranian Regime’s Agents in Germnya ALI AKBAR RASTGOUعلي اكبرراستگوبريده مزدور

 

The Iranian Regime’s Agents in Germnya:

Ali-Akbar Rastgou

  علي اكبرراستگوبريده مزدور عضو گشتاپوي ملاها 

شاخه بروخ مرزي

The Association of …

Autumn 2007

 

…

Ali-Akbar Rastgou is an agent of the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in Germany. Wearing the mask of a “former PMOI member, he serves the regime’s propaganda and misinformation campaign against Iranian dissidents, and especially the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and the Iranian Resistance as a whole. He has been a refugee in Germany since 1976. He established links with the regime’s embassy in Germany in 1988. Since then, he has become an agent of the MOIS. Some time after this, Rastgou traveled to Iran. An employee of the regime’s embassy in Germany, Abbasi, personally resolved all the issues involved with Rastgou’s travel at the Frankfurt and Tehran airports. At Tehran’s airport, the MOIS admitted Rastgou through a special gate without checking his luggage. He was then taken to a safe house in Tehran in a vehicle owned by the MOIS. Rastgou stayed in Iran for two weeks, but to prevent anyone from knowing about his assignment, he kept his Iran visit a secret, and did not even travel to Babel, his hometown. During the first week of his stay, Rastgou underwent special intelligence training in Tehran. He spent his second week in the city of Noshahr.

 When he came back from Iran, Rastgou vehemently tried to deny his Iran visit to the Iranians who knew him, and instead claimed to have traveled to Italy. However, there were individuals in Iran who had informed Iranian refugees abroad that they had seen Rastgou in Tehran traveling with MOIS agents.

 In addition to his close links with the regime’s embassy in Bonn, Ali-Akbar (aka Bahman) Rastgou also communicates directly with the MOIS department in charge of foreign operations in Tehran. The mediator is an individual identified as “Taghvaii,” with whom Rastgou is in contact using a cell phone. Rastgou receives instructions from Taghvaii during his visits to Tehran. In order to avoid blowing his cover, Rastgou conducts his intelligence gathering assignments against Iranian dissident in Germany under the guise of a taxi driver or an employee of a construction company, and moreover, he carries out his meetings with the regime’s agents in a hotel in Gissen (60 Km from Frankfurt). He also travels regularly to the German cities of Hamburg and Krefeld, and also the Netherlands, in order to swap intelligence information with the regime’s agents.

 The reason for the regime’s insistence on presenting Ali-Akbar Rastgou and other agents and associates in Europe and North America as “former PMOI members,” is the regime’s disgraced and reviled image on the international arena. The regime has been condemned on numerous occasions by the United Nations for its systematic and brutal human rights abuses, including the execution of 120,000 Iranians. Furthermore, since the regime’s propaganda is utterly discredited by the public opinion in Western countries, the mullahs need a cover for their psychological warfare and propaganda efforts against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, which remain to be the democratic alternative and the main existential threat for the religious tyranny in Iran. As such, they endeavour to erase their own fingerprints by presenting their agents under various guises. One of the regime’s tools in this undertaking are those who have defected from the PMOI, turned their back against the Resistance, and now cooperate with the regime and MOIS. Ali-Akbar Rasgou is one such agent.

 Rastgou has registered two associations in Cologne, Germany, under the names of “Committee in Defense of Former PMOI Prisoners” and “Iranian Freedom Lovers and Refugees Association,” using them as fronts for the regime’s agents to continue their intelligence gathering operations against Iranian dissidents and refugees, and more importantly, to continue the demonizing campaign against the Iranian Resistance.

 One of Rastgou’s main assignments is to publish and widely distribute books and publications against the PMOI sent by the MOIS. These books are mailed or distributed among Iranian refugees and foreign circles free of charge, since all costs are paid by the MOIS.

 Rastgou picks up packages of books sent by the MOIS from Tehran at the office of Iran Air at the Cologne-Bonn airport, and distributes them using his personal car.

 On October 25, 1996, the Iranian regime set up a seminar in Los Angeles, USA, which was attended by its agents operating abroad. Rastgou gave a speech at this seminar under the alias “Dr. Bahmanyar.” The seminar’s goal was to legitimize and justify the mullahs’ torture and executions of the Iranian people as well as their psychological war against the PMOI.

 In 1998, Rastgou was involved in publishing a weekly called “Dena” with the help of a number of other MOIS agents. The weekly, which was entirely dedicated to propaganda and psychological warfare against the Iranian Resistance, was mailed to Iranians free of charge. Rastgou obtained the recipients’ addresses through the regime’s embassy in Germany. The publication of this weekly was discontinued after Iranians expressed their hatred and disgust towards it and the regime’s discredited agents, including Ali-Akbar Rastgou.

 Participation in activities and sessions in various countries, paid and directed by the MOIS, constitutes another example of Rastgou’s assignments. As well, under the MOIS’s instructions, he writes letters or contacts government officials, parliamentarians, and institutions in various countries, especially in Europe. The main theme of all these efforts is to spread the mullahs’ lies against the main Iranian opposition movement, the PMOI, in order to buy support for pressuring and causing further restrictions against the Resistance.

Participating in the Knife-Wielding Assault Against Iranian Refugees in France

On June 17^th, 2007, the MOIS used a front organization named “The Association in Defence of Iranian Refugees and Residents in France,” to gather a number of its agents from France, Germany, and other European countries for a meeting at the Fiap building in Paris, entitled “The Seminar for Peace and Solidarity.” Agents attending the meeting included Javad Firouzmand, Jahangir Shadanlou, Mohammad-Hossein Sobhani, Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Anne Singleton, Ali-Akbar Rastgou, Hadi Shams-Haeri, Ali Rastbin, Alain Chevalerias, along with a couple of professional knife-wielders employed by the regime’s MOIS and embassy in Paris. These agents were equipped with weapons such as knives, tear gas, and knuckle-dusters, and were prepared and determined to attack Iranian dissidents and refugees.

Before the meeting took place, and upon being questioned by a number of political refugees outside of the building, the MOIS operatives, following previous plans, used knives, tear gas, and knuckle-dusters to violently attack and injure the dissidents, a number of whom were later hospitalized.

Subsequent to this brutal attack by the MOIS operatives, the French police arrived at the scene, and after conducting a spot investigation, gathered all the weapons at the sight. After identifying the assailants, the police cancelled the meeting, and arrested Mohammad-Hossein Sobhani and two other knife-wielding employees of the mullahs’ embassy. A number of MOIS agents, hastily fled the scene.

It is worth mentioning that Mohammad-Hossein Sobhani, the agent arrested during this incident, is a member of the MOIS front organization “Ava,” which operates under Ali-Akbar Rastgou’s name.

The German and Dutch Intelligence Reports

Intelligence reports from various European countries clearly prove some of the regime’s plots to carry out a misinformation campaign against the Iranian Resistance. Annual reports from the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) reiterate that the MOIS’s main target abroad is the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and the PMOI. The MOIS attempts to employ former members of these organizations for intelligence gathering and conducting of misinformation against the PMOI in order to weaken and discredit the organization.

 The Dutch Security Services (AIVD) wrote in its 1998 report that, “… Iranian agents are determined to identify members of opposition groups in order to destabilize their organizations. The current and former members of the MEK [i.e. PMOI] are especially monitored by Iran’s intelligence services. Iran’s MOIS intimidates Iranians to coerce them into cooperation.”

 In its 2000 report, AIVD wrote, “One of the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security is to identify individuals who are in contact with opposition groups abroad. Sympathizers of the main opposition group, the PMOI, are especially targeted by the MOIS … The MOIS attempts to gather intelligence about the organization from ‘former PMOI members.’ As well, MOIS agents have been ordered to disseminate harmful information against the PMOI and its members. They thus try to weaken the organization and demonize it in host countries in a bid to put an end to their political and social activities.”

 Recruiting and using a number of defectors or expelled individuals from the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance by the MOIS in Western countries has been noted and investigated by security agencies in many Western countries in the past. The extent of the MOIS activities is such that despite of the conciliatory attitude of Western governments towards the mullahs, German and Dutch intelligence reports in the past few years have unveiled a small part of such MOIS activities.

At the same time, an April 29, 1997 Council of Europe resolution stresses that, “cooperation among the member states to guarantee that no visas are granted to Iranians with intelligence and security related assignments,” and invites all the member states to “coordinated action when it comes to the expulsion of and blocking of Iranian intelligence and security personnel’s entry into the EU member states.”

 Ali-Akbar Rastgou has close relations with Karim Haghi, a well-known MOIS agent in the Netherlands. He often participates with Haghi in various intelligence gathering activities for the mullahs. On February 1, 2000, Haghi, in his publication called Payvand, reported the story of how the activities of himself and Rastgou were identified by security agencies in the Netherlands.  He reports that on Tuesday, Feb. 1, 2000, around 4:30 in the afternoon, a Dutch security officer visited his residence and requested to talk to him. After some initial talk, the officer read a number of names from a list, with Haghi and Rastgou’s names among them. Attachment 1, the report from Payvand, writes that the security agent added:

We have sufficient information that you are in contact with the regime and your publication’s costs are being paid by the regime. Also, we know that Mr. Shams Haeri is in contact with the regime, and his mediator with the MOIS is his brother, and that he has traveled to Singapore on one occasion to carry out his business.

The officer said: We want the Netherlands to be peaceful. We do not want protests and conflict here. It would be much better for you to quit what you are currently doing, and think about your life and family’s future.

Karim Haghi also writes:

On the same day, in 3 different German cities such as Cologne, Wiesbaden, Hennef, 6 individuals in groups of two visited Mr. Mehdi Khoshhal and Mr. Bahman [aka Ali-Akbar] Rastgou, and Ms. Nadereh Afshari. The theme of all the questioning revolved around contacts, Payvand’s circulation, and ways of obtaining the funding for it, etc.

In this regard, the Security and Counter Intelligence Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) issued a statement in February 2005, which read in part:

“…In recent weeks, police and security agencies in the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Sweden, Norway, Canada, etc. questioned a number of the regime’s agents and issued warnings to them, to the extent that the regime’s agents have reported to their contacts at the mullahs’ embassies and directly to the MOIS in Tehran, that the police had indisputable evidence and documents, including pictures and recorded conversations involving these individuals and their MOIS contacts. The police also had details about the agents’ secret trips to Iran and their travels to other countries such as Malaysia and Singapore to meet with MOIS agents. Additionally, it knows about their visits to European and American countries in recent months, and is aware that all the costs were paid by the MOIS. On some occasions, even their weekly or monthly wages, including the method of payment, were known to the police…

In Germany, security agents visited Ali-Akbar (aka Bahman) Rastgou, Mehdi Khoshhal, and Nadereh Afshari, and told them that they know about their contacts with the MOIS. They also questioned Rastgou about how he receives his payments from the MOIS for his involvement in publishing Payvand.”

The German police have paid close attention to Rastgou’s activities. In addition to the 2000 incident, Rastgou wrote a statement on December 11, 2003, stating that his house was searched again by the German police under the charges of possessing weapons and having a fake passport. This shows that for a long time he has been investigated by the German police under the suspicion that he is an agent of the regime.

Rastgou’s assignments and activities in Europe against the Iranian Resistance, including participation in ordered conferences and seminars, are widely reported in the regime’s domestic media and websites. For example, the MOIS conference in France, which was attended by about 30 agents sent from various countries, and which aimed to taint the image of the Iranian Resistance, received wide coverage in the regime’s media:

State-run Kayhan Daily, July 6, 2003:

Some of the defected members of the Grouplet Monafeqin [the mullahs’ name to refer to the PMOI] who have recently traveled to France, recounted how they were deceived, and discussed their goals and reasons for defection. Ali-Akbar Rastgou, who had spent years in the political unit of the terrorist group, told IRNA’s reporter in Paris: “I spent 10 years at the organization’s political unit. This unit was set up to cover up the organization’s military and violent activities.” Another defected member, who introduced himself as Karim Haghi … said in response to a question from reporters: “When we were members of the organization, we used to regularly travel between Iraq and France.” He added: “The organization has tens of command bases in France from which it orders bombings, terrorist operations, and assassinations of tens of Iranian citizens.”