The Iranian Regime’s Agents in Britain: Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton1
Anglo-Iranian
Community in Greater London
Autumn 2007
Table of Contents
Introduction
The Iranian Regime
Islamic Fundamentalism
Terrorism
Designation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
Defence
Ministry and Qods Force
The Mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
Use of Agents
by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The Mullahs' Agents in Britain
Witness
Statement of Mr. Winston Griffiths
Massoud and Anne
Khodabandeh (nee Singleton)
Unveiled Service to the Mullahs
Witness
Statement Of Abrahim Khodabandeh
Participating in the June 17th Plot
Participating
in the MOIS’s Spying and Terrorist Plot in Paris
The Failed Plot
of the Mullahs’ Regime in London
Participating in the Knife-Wielding Assault Against
Iranian Refugees in France
“Double Agents”
Introduction
In its 'Annual Report
2005-2006', the Parliamentary Intelligence & Security Committee referred to
increasing international tension over Iran's nuclear programme and its backing
for terrorist groups in the Middle East.
The Committee stated:
"There
is a possibility of an increased threat to UK interests from Iranian
state-sponsored terrorism should the diplomatic situation deteriorate."
The threat is
often repeated by officials of the Iranian regime. On 16 April 2006, The Sunday
Times reported Dr Hassan Abbasi, head of the Centre for Doctrinal Strategic
Studies in the Revolutionary Guards, as saying that 29 western targets had been
identified for suicide attacks. He added:
“We are ready to attack American and British sensitive points if they attack
Iran’s
nuclear facilities”. Abbasi warned
would-be martyrs to “pay close attention to wily England”
and vowed that “Britain’s
demise is on our agenda”.
The threat is why
the government and security services must properly investigate agents of the
Ministry of Intelligence operating in Britain and take steps to stop their
activities.
This paper
concentrates on the role played by the Ministry of Intelligence in terrorist
atrocities across the world. It also identifies agents of the regime operating
in Britain
and the steps needed to deal with the threats they pose.
The Iranian regime
Islamic fundamentalism
Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism emanating from it represent
the greatest threat to peace and stability worldwide. The heart of this
ideology, which subverts true Islam, beats in Tehran and took shape following the Iranian
revolution when the mullahs seized power. Khomeini’s regime transformed the idea of creating
global Islamic rule to an achievable goal and gave Islamic fundamentalist
groups global backing.
Iran was home to the first Islamic
fundamentalist regime in the world and the mullahs use the powers, resources
and facilities of a state to achieve their ambitions. Tehran continues to act as the heartland of
the extremist Islamic fundamentalist movement around the world.
Recent
years have seen a resurgence in the Iranian regime’s fundamentalist ideology,
which has reached its pinnacle with the instigation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as
President. Early in his Presidency,
Ahmadinejad proclaimed:
“Thanks to the blood of the martyrs, a new Islamic
revolution has arisen and the Islamic revolution of 1384 will, God willing, cut
off the roots of injustice in the world…The wave of the Islamic revolution will
soon reach the entire world.”
Ahmadinejad
has also spoken of the Middle East conflict as
being “the locus of the final war” between Muslims and the west.
Terrorism
The regime has long used terrorism as a policy
instrument to deal with challenges to its survival at home and abroad. At home,
the regime uses terrorism to confront rising public discontent, while boosting
the morale of its oppressive forces, in particular the Revolutionary Guards.
Abroad, the regime uses terrorism to blackmail and gain concessions from
western countries. Some of the earliest examples of this were in the early
1980s when the regime manufactured the hostage crisis in Lebanon. In
exchange for the release of western hostages, the regime secured concessions
from governments including the United States
and France.
It is widely acknowledged
within the international community that the Iranian regime is the most active
state sponsor of terrorism, having been responsible for more than 450 terrorist
atrocities worldwide resulting in thousands of deaths. Whether assassinating
Iranian dissidents in the heart of Europe or carrying out terrorist bombings
across the world, each terrorist operation starts in Tehran where the regime’s most senior leaders
choose their targets and develop their operations. Based on arrest warrants and
investigations conducted by European security services into assassinations of
Iranian dissidents in Europe, it is clear that
the highest ranks of the Iranian regime are involved in each terrorist
operation. This includes the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign
Ministry, the Ministry of Intelligence and the Qods Force of the Revolutionary
Guards.
In
Nov 7, 2007 , According to AFP, 145 Interpol member states attending the
world police body's annual general assembly in the Moroccan city of Marrakech,
voted against five leading Iranians, wanted by Argentina for their alleged role
in a 1994 bombing that killed 85 people.
Among those subjected to an arrest warrant
was Iran's former intelligence chief
Ali Fallahian and the former head of the country's Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen
Rezaei.
In November 2006 they issued arrest
warrants against eight Iranians, including former president Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani and former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati.
Designation of Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Defence Ministry and
Qods Force
On October 25, 2007, the U.S.
Government designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its
terrorist arm, the Qods (Jerusalem)
Force, Defence Ministry and a number of state-owned banks, companies and
officials for their support of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The IRGC's raison d'être – as stipulated in the
regime's constitution and reflected in its practices over the past three
decades – is to protect the clerical regime through the export of terrorism and
fundamentalism and brutal suppression in the country. In addition to its
involvement in the production of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear
weapons, the IRGC has carried out hundreds of terrorist operations abroad and
tortured and executed tens of thousands of political prisoners at home.
The mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The mullahs' Ministry of
Intelligence receives extensive state funding and spearheads terrorist
operations at home and abroad. The
Foreign Ministry uses diplomatic privilege to move agents sent by the Ministry
of Intelligence into countries where terrorist attacks are planned and to
coordinate operations out of Iran’s
embassies.
According to an April 2006
international arrest warrant issued by a Swiss judge, Ali Fallahian, who
currently serves as a senior security advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader,
masterminded the April 1990 assassination in Geneva of Professor Kazem Rajavi,
the representative in Switzerland of the Iranian regime's main opponents, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran. Fallahian was Iran’s Minister
of Intelligence at the time of the assassination.
In the spring of 1997, a
Berlin Court ruled that the regime’s top leaders, including the Supreme Leader
and Fallahian, were part of a “special operations committee” that ordered the
murder of four Iranian Kurds in a restaurant in the German Capital in
1992. Other Iranian dissidents
assassinated in Europe include Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi, former diplomat and
representative of the NCRI in Italy, who was assassinated in Rome in 1993,
Zahra Rajabi, member of the NCRI, who was assassinated in Istanbul in 1996, and
Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan, who was assassinated in Vienna in 1989. These cases illustrate the role played by the
Ministry of Intelligence in terrorist operations in the heart of Europe.
Dissidents inside Iran were also
the victim of death squads sent by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence. At
the end of 1998, a number of intellectuals were brutally murdered in Tehran, in what became
known as the "chain murders".
A year later, the regime was forced to admit that the ring leader of the
murder gang was none other than the Deputy Intelligence Minister, Saeid Emami.
But, the crimes of the
mullah's Ministry of Intelligence stretch much further. Suicide attacks incited by Islamic
fundamentalist ideology are a hallmark of Iran’s terrorism. Two of the
earliest and largest ever suicide bomb attacks carried out by agents of the
regime were on the US Embassy and then the US Marine Headquarters in the
Lebanon in 1983, which killed 258 Americans, including 241 US marines. Again, the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
was directly involved. The Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia Dhahran in 1996 had all the hallmarks of MOIS involvement.
In 2005, the Revolutionary
Guards announced the formation of a ‘Martyrdom-seekers’ garrison, for the
training of suicide bombers for operations against “Islam’s foes”. On 13 February 2006, speaking to a group of
suicide volunteers, a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards and the
commander of Martyrdom-seekers Garrison, Mohammad-Reza Jaafari, stated:
“Now that
America is after gaining allies against the righteous Islamic Republic and
wants to attack our sanctities, members of the martyrdom-seeking garrisons across
the world have been put on alert so that if the Islamic Republic of Iran
receives the smallest threat, the American and Israeli strategic interests will
be burnt down everywhere…The only tool against the enemy that we have with
which we can become victorious are martyrdom-seeking operations and, God
willing, our possession of faithful, brave, trained and zealous persons will
give us the upper hand in the battlefield.”
Apart from
carrying out its own terrorist operations, the Iranian regime has long used
foreign groups in the Middle East and
elsewhere to carry out terrorist attacks abroad. These groups, funded and armed
by the regime, have operated throughout Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Over
the past couple of years, the Iranian regime, and in particular its Ministry of
Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards, have been most active in Iraq and
Afghanistan, where terrorists armed and funded by the regime are responsible
for widespread killing of civilians and deadly attacks on Coalition forces.
Use of agents
by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The regime and
its Ministry of Intelligence have focused considerable resources in recruiting
agents in Europe for use against their main
opponents and Iranian refugees. This is
a matter to which Interior Ministries and intelligence services in Europe have drawn attention.
In its May 2002
annual report, Germany’s
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) repeated findings
made previously that the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry had been active
in Germany.
In its report under the heading, ‘People’s Mojahedin of Iran, prime
target of surveillance operations’, BFV states:
“The
Iranian opposition in exile in Germany
remains the focus of surveillance activities of the Iranian Intelligence, VEVAK
(the Ministry of Intelligence),… which keeps them under systematic surveillance
and observation.”
The report also
said that the main target of these surveillance and other activities are the
NCRI and its largest member organisation, the PMOI, which it described as being
active around the world. The report added:
“VEVAK is
apparently concentrating its efforts at the moment on neutralising opposition
groups and their political activities. VEVAK is directing and financing a
misinformation campaign which is also carried out through former opponents of
the regime. As in previous years, the Iranian intelligence service is trying to
recruit active or former members of opposition groups. This in many cases is
done by threats to use force against them or their families living in Iran …
Iranian diplomatic missions and consulates in Germany provide a suitable base
for the country’s intelligence services to gather information on Iranian
dissidents living in Germany. A large quantity of interesting information can
be gathered within the framework of consular services to Iranians. This
information is analysed by Iranian secret service agents working under cover in
Germany
and is enriched with complimentary information. Final decisions on suggestions
on recruitment are made by VEVAK’s headquarters in Tehran. Freer travel between Germany and Iran has provided good facilities
for VEVAK agents to establish their contacts and recruit agents”.
In its 2006 report, BFV maintained,
The 2006 report by the Federal
Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in Germany makes reference to the activities of the
MOIS thus: "The primary interest of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence
is focused on the People's Mojahedin Organization (MEK) and its political arm,
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The MOIS tries to
recruit current and former members of this group to use them as spies in order
to obtain information on the antigovernment activities of this organization…
The MOIS has a secret office in the Iranian embassy in Berlin. MOIS agents work under diplomatic
cover and try to brief and assign those affiliated with its intelligence
services to engage in intelligence gathering activities in Germany."
The Dutch
Internal Security Service (AIVD), in its May 2002 annual report, exposed the
illegal and secret activities of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence in
Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands. The report stated:
“One of
the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security is to track down
and identify those who are in contact with opposition groups abroad. Supporters
of the most important opposition group, the People’s Mojahedin, are especially
under scrutiny of Iranian Security Services more than any other group.”
The report added that officials of the Iranian regime:
“…exert
pressure on Western countries to condemn and ban this group [PMOI]. The
Intelligence Ministry tries to gather information on the People’s Mojahedin
Organisation [and its members]. They are trying therefore, to destabilise the
organisation and demonise the Mojahedin in the host country and thus end their
political and social activities. The Mojahedin are aware of these
activities...Through the National Council of Resistance of Iran, they
inform the authorities of host countries of the secret activities of the
Iranian Intelligence Ministry which is trying to spread negative information
against them.”
More recent
reports record the extensive activities of the Ministry of Intelligence in Europe. European
security services have warned agents of the mullahs about their links with the
Iranian regime. In February 2000, an
agent called Shams Haeri was interrogated by the Dutch security services
about his contacts with the ministry.
Another agent, Karim
Haqi, was warned about his activities against Iranian refugees and
opponents of the regime living in Europe. In a
publication, 'Peyvand', which is published by Haqi he wrote:
"On Tuesday, 1 February 2000, around 4:30 pm, a
Dutch undercover security agent went to Karim Haqqi’s residence in the Elst Township…
After reading a list of names, the agent added: ‘All of you have ties with the
Iranian regime and have formed a large network…’ The security agent said: ‘we
have sufficient information that you have relations with the [Iranian] regime
and it [the regime] pays for your publication. We also know that Mr. Shams
Haeri is connected with the [Iranian] Intelligence Ministry and his brother is
the contact person…’ The security agent said: ‘we want a calm Netherlands and
are not interested in demonstrations and clashes here. It would suit you better
to stop this kind of work and go after your normal business and think about the
future of your children’"
Lord Avebury,
who has extensively researched and written about Iran’s misinformation
campaigns against the PMOI, said about such individuals in his book 'Iran:
State of Terror',
"These persons, due to their low or non-existent
motivation to continue the struggle and maintain their principles, allowed
themselves to be bought by the regime at a later stage. Such people have so far
provided the regime's terrorists in Europe
with most extensive intelligence and political services."
Win Griffiths, a respected
former Member of Parliament who has a great deal of expertise in Iranian
affairs, set out his own experience and that of his Parliamentary colleagues.
Mr. Griffiths explained that whenever a Member of Parliament expresses support
for the goals of freedom and a secular democracy for Iran,
as espoused by the NCRI and PMOI, they are bombarded with misinformation about Iran's
main opposition. On some occasions MPs and Peers are contacted directly by the
Iranian Embassy in London,
while more often they are approached by people claiming to be disaffected
former members of the PMOI who have been recruited by the regime.
The mullahs' agents in Britain
Massoud
Khodabandeh is one of the most active agents of the mullah regime’s Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in Britain, and also carries out the
plans of the mullahs’ Gestapo against the Iranian Resistance in a number of
different countries, under the guise of a former member of the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). He was born in Tehran in 1956. In 1974, he left Iran for Britain. In 1980 he joined the PMOI
sympathizers, and in 1986, he was sent to the Iran-Iraq border at his own
request.
In
1993, Khodabandeh informed the organization of his lack of ability to continue
the struggle and proclaimed his defection. In 1998, he traveled to Singapore claiming
he was to attend the World Confederation of Labour there. According to his
brother, however, Khodabandeh met with MOIS agents in Singapore. From
that point on, Massoud Khodabandeh began his activities against the PMOI as an
active agent of the mullahs abroad.
After
a while, Khodabandeh married Anne Singleton. Singleton had begun cooperating
with mullahs’ MOIS in 1997. She regularly visits Iran and acts as a sort of liaison
between Khodabandeh and the MOIS. Singleton accompanied the MOIS at the
notorious Evin prison during a visit to Tehran
by former British Member of Parliament Winston Griffiths. After returning home,
Mr. Griffiths explained that he discovered a British woman’s (i.e. Anne
Singleton) relations with the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry when he
met with her at the Evin prison alongside the mullahs’ agents.
The
MOIS has also set up a website to pursue its goals against the Iranian
Resistance through Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton in Britain. In
practice, the site, whose only purpose is to vilify the PMOI and the Iranian
Resistance, attempts to provide the groundwork for terrorist activities against
the members of the Resistance, and publishes the misinformation produced by the mullahs’ MOIS,
proliferating it in international organizations and some other websites.
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