شروع افشاگري بريده مزدوران وتوابان وهمنشينهاي جلادان بزبان انگليسي (از كريم حقي شروع ميكنيم)The Iranian Regime’s Agents in the Netherlands:Karim Haqi (1)

دوستان عزيز براي خنثي كردن طرحهاي جنايتكارانه وزارت اطلاعات كه با شيوه هاي مختلف عليه خلق مان وپيشتازان قهرمان خلق در ليبرتي وداخل كشور وديگر پناهندگان خارج ومجاهدين خلق ايران انجام ميدهد از امروز يكي از شاخه هاي اصلي كه در واقع بكار گيري بريده مزدوران وتوابان تشنه بخون وهمنشين جلاد ها هستند را بزبان انگليسي افشا خواهيم كرد تا هر كجا كه توانستيم ادامه ميدهيم هر كجا هم كه نتوانستيم از همين الان از شما كمك خواسته وعذرخواهي ميكنيم

    

 

 

The Iranian Regime’s Agents in the Netherlands:

Karim Haqi

The Iranian Refugees Association in the Netherlands

Fall 2007

 

Introduction

Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism associated with it are the biggest threat to global peace, stability, and security. Islamic fundamentalism, which distorts the religion of Islam and takes advantage of it toward its malevolent goals, was formed after the mullahs hijacked the anti-monarchical revolution, obtained political power in Iran in 1979, and formed a medieval theocracy under the banner of the “Rule of the Jurisprudent” (concept of “velayat-e faqih” or absolute rule of the clerics). This regime is essentially at odds with the modern world and sees its survival in repressing the Iranian people and exporting fundamentalism and terrorism abroad in the context of its goal for the creation of an “Islamic Empire.” The regime pursues this sinister objective by forming and providing full support to fundamentalist groups and organizations. It also attempts to get its hands on a nuclear weapon in order to be able to sustain such policies.

As domestic and international crises mount, especially after the recent war in Iraq, the ruling mullahs have adopted an aggressive posture. As such, the mullahs conferred the regime’s presidency to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and one of the most fanatical factions within the ruling elite, in order to execute their repressive policies at home and broaden efforts to expand terrorism, fundamentalism, conflict and chaos throughout the region.

Past experiences and present realities in Iran and the region highlight the fact that the way to confront the mullahs is neither the policy of appeasement, the ineffectiveness of which has been proven during the last three decades, nor a foreign military intervention. The real solution to the threat of the mullahs lies in democratic change by the Iranian people and their organized resistance movement. This is precisely what the mullahs fear as their most serious existential threat, because, as the United States Congress and many European parliamentarians have noted, the Iranian Resistance is sustaining a democratic struggle against the mullahs in order to establish democracy, rule of law, separation of religion and state, and equality for women in Iran. The central force within the Iranian Resistance, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), with its firm belief in a democratic and tolerant Islam, is the antithesis and the only alternative to a barbaric regime that abuses Islam in order to justify its dictatorial and expansionist policies. This is especially true since the Iranian Resistance made the international community aware of the clandestine nuclear weapons program of the mullahs, and as such averted a potential global catastrophe. Such awareness made the international community more aware of the mullahs’ threat and caused it to prevent the mullahs from being able to acquire nuclear weapons.

The PMOI also revealed the facts about the regime’s terrorist and fundamentalist activities, especially its meddling in Iraq, by bringing into light the names, particulars, and bank accounts of more than 32,000 cohorts and agents of the mullahs in Iraq and its governmental institutions. As such, the Resistance made the international community alert of another threat posed by the mullahs, which is indeed hundreds of times greater than that of the regime’s nuclear weapons program. Consequently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its extraterritorial terrorist arm, the Qods Force, were placed on the list of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and the list of terrorist organizations.

Additionally, the Iranian Resistance exposed the mullahs’ horrific human rights record through an extensive global diplomatic and political campaign. As such, it played a decisive role in the condemnation of the regime at various United Nations organs on 54 different occasions.

It is for these reasons, that the religious dictatorship ruling Iran, in conjunction with its repression and assassinations, utilizes every single resource it has at its disposal to taint and discredit the image of the Iranian Resistance on the world stage. To reach this objective, the mullahs have sustained an overwhelming campaign of vilification against the Resistance in a bid to compel the International community, and specifically Europe and the United States, into believing that there are no credible alternatives for their regime. They even claim that the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, i.e. the mullahs’ biggest existential threats, are worst and more dangerous than the Iranian regime. As a result, they want the world to believe that it is best to deal with the current medieval religious dictatorship ruling Iran, and in return for offering lucrative trade deals, they expect the world to collaborate with them in repressing the Iranian opposition movement.

In order to grasp the real extent of the regime’s apprehension when it comes to the PMOI, it would suffice to note the comments made by Mike Gapes, chair of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, in a parliamentary session on November 28, 2007, after returning from a trip to Iran:

“…When we went to Iran I certainly and I think my colleagues, were struck by the number of times that the Iranians wanted to raise the issue of what they call the MKO terrorist organisation or clique or some other term of that kind to a level of almost of obsession that it was on their program, they wanted us to talk about it and they raised it in lots of different contexts.”

It is worth noting that the mullahs, in addition to an official propaganda campaign and resorting to diplomatic efforts and trade deals against the Iranian Resistance, have unofficially dedicated the resources and capabilities of several ministries and governmental institutions along with an annual budget amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, and agents, networks, and front organizations (in the guise of “opposition activists”) to wage a vilifying campaign against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance. This is because the regime’s status as a hated abuser of human rights (a record stained with oppression, hangings, stoning, torture, and public executions), and its export of fundamentalism, terrorism and chaos have severely restricted its propaganda abilities through official governmental channels.

For this reason, the mullahs’ Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), which is in reality a notorious organized crime network engaged in killings, assassinations, surveillance, and a host of other sinister activities, wages a vilifying campaign against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance through its agents and front organizations in European countries and the US. These agents are generally used and introduced as “former PMOI members and officials.”

Some of these agents include those who from the very beginning belonged to the MOIS or the IRGC’s Qods Force, and were assigned a mission to infiltrate the ranks of the PMOI and the National Liberation Army (NLA) in Iraq. After the true identities and mission of these individuals were revealed, the PMOI sent them back following the completion of investigations. The regime’s MOIS sends some of these people on missions abroad, so that they can introduce themselves as “former PMOI members,” who have been tortured and harassed by the PMOI, forcibly returned to Iran, and have now escaped Iran to seek asylum abroad. They claim that they are facing threats from both the PMOI and the Iranian regime. Agents such as Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, Farhad Javaheri-Yar, and Hossein Sadeqian, fit into this category.

The second category includes individuals that were at a time opposed to the regime and within the Resistance’s ranks, but due to the hardships and difficulties demanded by the struggle against the regime, and because of their inability to face these difficulties, they left the Resistance and sold themselves to the regime’s MOIS. The PMOI’s relentless struggle for freedom and democracy against the mullahs’ religious dictatorship has gathered hundreds of thousands of members and sympathizers around this movement. According to the regime’s officials, in the early 1980s alone, the PMOI had organized more than half a million people in Iran (Memoirs of Hashemi Rafsanjani, regime’s former president).

Throughout this hard struggle for freedom, more than 120,000 people have sacrificed their lives, executed by the religious fascism ruling Iran. Such a difficult road means that some individuals can no longer tolerate the brunt and leave the Resistance’s ranks to continue on with their ordinary lives. Such a mechanism of people being drawn to and leaving the ranks, is characteristic of any resistance movement throughout history, and would especially be the case for a movement fighting against the most brutal dictatorship in modern times.

As such, throughout the years, a considerable number of people have left the Resistance’s ranks and returned to their personal lives. The overwhelming majority of these individuals continue to be the Resistance movement’s sympathizers and each works to garner support for the movement according to his/her abilities. Many of them have countered the MOIS’s psychological warfare and false propaganda against the PMOI and the Resistance. However, a small number of people have also been drawn or threatened to collaborate with the MOIS. Agents such as Karim Haqi, Shams Haeri, Massoud Jabani, Habib Khorrami, and Massoud Khodabandeh, among others, fit into this category.

In a book published by the Human Rights Group at the British Parliament, Lord Avebury writes the following about such agents:

“Another method (used by the Iranian intelligence service) is using the small number of defectors who had at one stage cooperated with opposition organizations and individuals. These persons, due to their low or non-existent motivation to continue the struggle and maintain their principles, allowed themselves to be bought by the regime at a later stage. Such people have so far provided the regime’s terrorists in Europe with the most extensive intelligence and political services. In addition to providing information on the assassination targets to the regime, they prepare the political grounds for the murders of the dissidents by spreading propaganda against the individuals or organizations they had previously cooperated with, defaming them and accusing them of being worse than the ruling regime.”

Therefore, the MOIS sends such agents as “opposition activists” to various places, forms front organizations and introduces them as “independent” (again, as “opposition”), creates websites, publishes and distributes volumes of newsletters, brochures, colorful books, and organizes events and conferences with the help of these agents and organizations, all in order to execute its political and propaganda campaign against the Iranian Resistance. These agents and associations deny their true political identity and links with the MOIS, and present themselves as “former PMOI members and officials” who still remain opposed to the mullahs in Iran.

Win Griffiths, a former minister and respected member of the British Parliament, who is an expert in Iranian affairs, has shared his own and his colleagues’ experiences in this regard. In a statement to Britain’s Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission (POAC) in July 2007, he stated:

“whenever a Member of Parliament expresses support for the goals of freedom and a secular democracy for Iran, as espoused by the NCRI and PMOI, they are immediately bombarded with misinformation about Iran's main opposition from a variety of sources. Sometimes MPs and Peers are contacted directly by the Iranian Embassy in London, which tries to convince Parliamentarians that they have misunderstood the Iranian regime and been deceived about the true nature of the NCRI and PMOI. On other occasions, disaffected former members of the PMOI who have been recruited by the Iranian regime to spread misinformation against the PMOI approach Parliamentarians.”

As mentioned above, to carry out the MOIS objectives against the Iranian Resistance, these agents are directed and operate in the context of a string of front organizations and different websites, all controlled by the MOIS, in various countries. Some of the MOIS front organizations in Iran include the “Nejat association,” “Habilian,” “Victims of Violence,” and websites under the same names.

Outside of Iran, MOIS runs front associations such as Iran Payvand, Iran Interlink, Ava, Ghalam, etc., and operates website under the same names.

Western security services are aware of the Iranian regime taking advantage of the democratic conditions available to it in the West to expand its intelligence and spying activities in such countries.

Official German and Dutch Security Services Reports

The regime and its Ministry of Intelligence have focused considerable resources in recruiting agents in Europe for use against their main opponents and Iranian refugees.  This is a matter to which Interior Ministries and intelligence services in Europe have drawn attention.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV)  in Germany, in it’s 1999 annual report noted:

“The principal objective of the Iranian secret service continues to be the fight against Iranian oppositionists. The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and its political wing, the NCRI, are still the top target of the Intelligence Ministry’s activities. To fight against the activities of the opposition in exile, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has set up a series of cultural associations. These operate as a front for the MOIS and the Iranian regime. Other than this, the MOIS tries to publish various publications, some in the name of those who introduce themselves as ex-members of the PMOI, in order to persuade sympathizers to abandon the organization.”

In its May 2002 annual report, Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) repeated findings made previously that the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry had been active in Germany. In its report under the heading, ‘People’s Mojahedin of Iran, prime target of surveillance operations’, BFV states:

“The Iranian opposition in exile in Germany remains the focus of surveillance activities of the Iranian Intelligence, VEVAK (the Ministry of Intelligence),… which keeps them under systematic surveillance and observation.”

The report also said that the main target of these surveillance and other activities are the NCRI and its largest member organisation, the PMOI, which it described as being active around the world. The report added:

“VEVAK is apparently concentrating its efforts at the moment on neutralising opposition groups and their political activities. VEVAK is directing and financing a misinformation campaign which is also carried out through former opponents of the regime. As in previous years, the Iranian intelligence service is trying to recruit active or former members of opposition groups. This in many cases is done by threats to use force against them or their families living in Iran … Iranian diplomatic missions and consulates in Germany provide a suitable base for the country’s intelligence services to gather information on Iranian dissidents living in Germany. A large quantity of interesting information can be gathered within the framework of consular services to Iranians. This information is analysed by Iranian secret service agents working under cover in Germany and is enriched with complimentary information. Final decisions on suggestions on recruitment are made by VEVAK’s headquarters in Tehran. Freer travel between Germany and Iran has provided good facilities for VEVAK agents to establish their contacts and recruit agents”.

The 2006 report by the Federal Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in Germany makes reference to the activities of the MOIS thus:

"The primary interest of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence is focused on the People's Mojahedin Organization (MEK) and its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The MOIS tries to recruit current and former members of this group to use them as spies in order to obtain information on the antigovernment activities of this organization… The MOIS has a secret office in the Iranian embassy in Berlin. MOIS agents work under diplomatic cover and try to brief and assign those affiliated with its intelligence services to engage in intelligence gathering activities in Germany."

The Dutch Internal Security Service (AIVD), in its May 2002 annual report, exposed the illegal and secret activities of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence in Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands. The report stated:

“One of the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security is to track down and identify those who are in contact with opposition groups abroad. Supporters of the most important opposition group, the People’s Mojahedin, are especially under scrutiny of Iranian Security Services more than any other group.”

The report added that officials of the Iranian regime:

“…exert pressure on Western countries to condemn and ban this group [PMOI]. The Intelligence Ministry tries to gather information on the People’s Mojahedin Organisation [and its members]. They are trying therefore, to destabilise the organisation and demonise the Mojahedin in the host country and thus end their political and social activities. The Mojahedin are aware of these activities...Through the National Council of Resistance of Iran, they inform the authorities of host countries of the secret activities of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry which is trying to spread negative information against them.”

The Mullah Regime’s Agents in the Netherlands

 Karim Haqi

Karim Haqi is one of the most loathed MOIS agents outside of Iran. He resides in the Netherlands, but travels with MOIS grants to carry out assigned missions and organize events and meetings, which the MOIS sets up in the US and various European countries against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance.

Karim Haqi began to serve the MOIS in 1995. His links with the MOIS were originally secret, but from 1996 onwards he was in direct and regular contact with the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands. His contact with the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands is an individual identified as “Maqsoudi.” After a while, Haqi turned out to be one of the most active MOIS agents in the Netherlands and European countries.

After being with the PMOI and the NLA in Iraq, in 1991 during the First Gulf War and the ensuing bombings of Iraq, Karim Haqi announced that he cannot continue to stay in the NLA citing “physical problems.” Haqi and his wife (Mohtaram Babai) requested that they leave NLA bases and be sent to Baghdad to continue on with their personal lives. The PMOI transferred Haqi to Baghdad and provided him with all the necessities for a normal life. In a letter dated November 1992, Haqi wrote in this regard:

"As you know, following the bombing of Ashraf camp, the organization (PMOI) transferred me (Karim Haqi Monii, combatant of the Liberation Army) and my wife and children to a Jalalzadeh urban base in Baghdad city center. This was of course upon my request and my wife. During this period, in addition to all facilities which were available for every combatant and members of the organization, we received twice as much attention and special food and personal requirements were provided to us. On top of all, a private apartment and a car for family use in the city were given to us and we received 1,000 Iraqi dinars every month. Me and my family were not restricted in any way."

After a few months in Baghdad, during which he was provided with all the required necessities and resources, Karim Haqi requested that he be sent to the US or Europe. In January 1993 the PMOI paid for and transferred Haqi and his wife to France. There, he was helped by the PMOI to obtain a political asylum. All the living expenses for Haqi and his wife in France were paid by the PMOI. These included deposit and rent for a place to live, basic home appliances, monthly expenses, etc.

While the legal status of his refugee application was not yet resolved, Haqi suddenly decided to go to the Netherlands and become a refugee there instead. Based on the information and documents obtained later, it was revealed that the reason for his move to the Netherlands was his links with the MOIS through his brother.

After cutting ties with the PMOI, Haqi began to serve the mullahs’ MOIS in carrying out its policies to vilify the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance. After four years, he claimed that he and his wife (Mohtaram Babai) were tortured and jailed by the PMOI in Iraq, and that three years later, and because of such torture and pressures inflicted in Iraq, his wife committed suicide in the Netherlands.

Karim Haqi’s Wife Commits Suicide in Protest to his Treason and Corrupt Behavior

After Haqi established contacts with the mullahs’ MOIS through the regime’s embassy in the Netherlands, a large number of means and resources were made available for him. According to Iranians residing in the Netherlands and his friends, Karim Haqi was engaged in extra-marital affairs. After finding out about this, his wife, Mohtaram Babai, became emotionally distraught. Not being able to tolerate Haqi’s behavior, in April 1995, Mohtaram Babai committed suicide in protest to Haqi’s illegitimate relations.

Jamshid Tafrishi, a friend of the couple, who according to his own testimony cooperated with the MOIS, temporarily cut ties with the MOIS and revealed some information about the plans and activities of the MOIS’s network outside Iran. In his book, “The Plots and Plans of the MOIS against the PMOI,” (p. 60), Tafrishi writes about Mohtaram Babai’s suicide:

"A few days after the start of the Iranian new year in 1995 (Iranian new year starts on March 21) I telephoned Karim Haqi's home and Mohtaram Babai, his wife answered and said he was not home. …after making some complaints about Karim Haqi, Mohtaram said, 'Since we have arrived in the Netherlands he has turned my life into hell. His dirty doings have reached a level that sometimes I cannot tolerate and I want to kill myself.' Three days later I heard that she had committed suicide. When she became certain that Karim Haqi had extramarital relations with another woman, she made her final decision and hanged herself from the ceiling of the bathroom in her residence."

According to these sources, the MOIS instructed Haqi to blame his wife’s suicide on the PMOI.

At first, Haqi had decided to send Mohtaram Babai’s body to Iran with the help of the regime’s embassy in the Netherlands. However, the MOIS suggested that the body be buried in the Netherlands in order to use it as a propaganda tool against the PMOI. This was done by Maqsoudi (who was in charge of the network of the regime’s agents at its consulate in the Netherlands).

In return for Haqi’s cooperation, and in the span of less than a week, Maqsoudi arranged for the travel of a number of Babai’s family members who had been released from prison to the Netherlands. After coming to the Netherlands and discovering Haqi’s status and his role in the story, the Babai family expressed anger and disgust at what he had done.

Meanwhile, in conjunction with Haqi and Maqsoudi’s claims at the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands, state-run media outlets in Iran, such as the Kayhan and Resalat dailies, quoted Haqi in December 1995, writing, “His wife was tortured in PMOI prisons, and after being released went to the Netherlands, but despite months of treatment, she finally died.”

Mohtaram Babai’s last letter, which reveals her reasons for committing suicide, is at the hands of the Dutch police. Every Iranian refugee and the couple’s friends know that the real reason Babai committed suicide was her heated conflicts with her husband Karim Haqi. According to their friends, Ms. Babai continually expressed her anger about Haqi’s illegitimate relations, such that on numerous occasions the couple’s fights escalated to physical violence, which could no longer be tolerated by Ms. Babai, and thus led to her suicide.

Statements by Minister of Justice and the Interior of the Dutch Government

In 1999, as part of its psychological warfare and lies against the Iranian Resistance, the MOIS tried to claim that the PMOI had attacked the home and office of Haqi in Germany and the Netherlands, and stole his belongings, on three different occasions, the last one of which was on March 28, 1998. He filed a complaint against the PMOI in Arnheim, the town of his residence. But, the allegations and charges levied were so ridiculous that Arnheim’s prosecutor formally announced that he does not consider the complaint “worthy to be reviewed within the criminal process of the Netherlands,” and thus refused to continue working on the complaint.

With regards to the allegations made by Karim Haqi and other agents of the mullahs’ regime in the Netherlands against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, a number of the representatives of the Dutch Parliament, posed some questions to the ministers of the Interior and Justice in the Netherlands. In reply, the said ministers rejected the validity of the accusations (See the minutes from the Parliamentary proceedings, Dutch Parliament, 1998-1999, No. 1435):

Questions:

1- Are you aware of an article published in the de Volkskrant daily about the people's Mojahedin on April 28?

2- What is your view and judgment about allegations made by Karim Haqi (a veteran member of the organization) regarding the activities of the Mojahedin in the Netherlands in which, according to him, has advanced and turned into a Mafia Style organization whose task is to smuggle people and collect money using fraudulent methods and putting pressure on its opponents?

3- Does the Dutch government have any other information on possible illegal activities of the Mojahedin in the Netherlands?

Answers:

Answer to first questioni is: Yes

Answer to questions 2 and 3: If there had been any such activities or any documents in that regard in the Netherlands, they have not reached the police or the Justice Department, except a complaint submitted by Karim Haqi about a case of robbery and his article in de Volkskrant on April 28, 1999. The Mojahedin are known in The Netherlands as an organization that organizes peaceful demonstrations. It is also apparent that they collect contributions in the streets under an affiliated charity called SIM. In that respect, there has been some conflict on the way the collectors deal with the people to raise contributions. But there is no record or document indicating that Mojahedin have been involved in smuggling people or committing any other serious illegal acts of a criminal nature.

“Iran Payvand”: An MOIS Front Association

“Iran Payvand” is one of the MOIS’s front associations abroad. It was set up by the MOIS through Karim Haqi. A publication entitled “Payvand” is also meant to carry out the regime’s propaganda against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance. This publication is mailed to Iranians free of charge. The MOIS collects the postal addresses of Iranian refugees with the help of its agents and provides Haqi with this information so that he can send them the publications. The goal of mailing such publications is to pressure Iranian refugees to return to Iran as well as to vilify the Iranian Resistance. As well, some of the funds sent by the MOIS to Haqi and other agents for their activities are wired into the Payvand publication’s bank account.

The mullahs’ MOIS has also rented a three storey building in Kleve, Germany, for Haqi and a number of other agents to conduct their activities. The reason the MOIS has chosen Kleve as the “Iran Payvand” association’s office is that from this location it is faster and easier for Haqi to carry out his assignments for the MOIS in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

Another MOIS assignment for Karim Haqi and his associates is to send free MOIS publications, penned in his own name or other names, against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance (published in the Netherlands or Iran), to foreign political and social figures  (in Europe, US, Canada, Australia, etc.) who support the Resistance (See Attachment 1).

Haqi also sends thousands of copies of costly MOIS publications against the PMOI, free of charge, and in the form of “independent” publications, to the Resistance’s friends and neighbors in France (especially the town of Auvers sur-Oise and other cities in Val d’Oise).

Saeed Emami, an MOIS Deputy, Acknowledgements

Jamshid Tafrishi, an MOIS agent and one of Haqi’s former associates, writes in his book, “The Plots and Plans of MOIS against the PMOI”:

"In March 1996, Karim Haqi met with Saiid Emami (one of the senior officials of the Ministry of Intelligence who was in charge of terrorist operations abroad against members of the opposition. According to officials of the regime, he had carried out 150 successful operations outside Iran) in Singapore.

"Peyvand publication was a cover to receive money which was to pay for members of the network… around mid June 1997, Reza, Emami's deputy, contacted and said that we had to give the task of publishing a journal to Karim Haqi… the journal fulfills part of our requirements and asked me (Jamshid Tafreshi) to write articles to be published in the journal under the name of Karim Haqi or others… following the publication of the first issue of Peyvan in August 1997, Amir Hossein Taqavi (general director of the European bureau of the Ministry of Intelligence who was the head of the Special Operations since 1992 and directly led terrorist operations abroad) called me (Jamshid Tafreshi) and asked me to give my views on the journal."

Therefore, Haqi receives money and other resources directly from the PMOI in Tehran. He is also in contact with other well-known MOIS agents in Europe. In order to keep these links secret, for a while, Haqi’s meetings with MOIS officials were being held in some east Asian countries such as Singapore.

Through its lobbies and political connections in various countries, the regime also arranges meetings for Haqi and other MOIS agents, presenting themselves as “opposition activists,” with human rights figures and organizations and parliamentarians, so that it can discredit the Iranian Resistance in their eyes through its vilification campaign.

However, Iranian residents and refugees wonder how Karim Haqi and other agents like him who claim that they are just a group of refugees and have no other source of income, can afford the costs of lucrative trips (at times in groups of tens) to various European destinations and the US, and set up so-called seminars and conferences. Iranians wonder who pays the high costs for extensive propaganda against the PMOI, setting up TV networks like Payvand TV, publishing various materials such as Payvand, Iran Payvand, etc., which are managed and run by the agents. These activities, in light of their nature and objectivem, which is to vilify the Iranian Resistance, and the lavish costs associated with them, cannot be paid for by anyone other than the MOIS and its abundant budget.

Dutch Police Warning to Karim Haqi with Regards to His Links with the MOIS

The cooperation and contact of Karim Haqi and other agents with the mullahs’ MOIS in the Netherlands and other countries, has not gone unnoticed for the Dutch police and security services.

 In February 2000, the Dutch police visited Haqi and a number of other regime agents, and issued warnings to them with regards to their activities and links with the MOIS in the Netherlands and countries like Norway, Germany, and Canada. Karim Haqi himself confessed to this in his “Iran Payvand” (See Attachment 2):

On Tuesday, February 1, 2000, an agent of the Dutch secret service arrived at Karim Haghi’s residence in Elst and, after initial talks… He said: “All of you are in contact with the Iranian regime and have formed a large network… You must tell us who else is in contact with the Iranian regime … We have enough information about your ties with the regime and know that your publication is being financed by the Iranian regime. We also know that Mr. Shams Haeri is in touch with the regime and his contact with the Ministry of Intelligence is his brother. He has traveled to Singapore to meet his MOIS contacts… We want the Netherlands calm and peaceful and do not like to have demonstrations and fighting here. It is best for you to abandon this sort of work at once and go after a normal life and think of your children’s future.”

On the same day another secret agent was present at the parking lot near the workplace of Mrs. Roya Roodsaz, Karim Haghi’s wife, and when she was about to get into her car, he introduced himself and told her that he intended to talk to her. He talked about Haghi’s activities and where the funds for Peyvand publication were coming from. The secret agent told her that Karim and his friends have formed a large network and all of them are in touch with the Iranian regime. Karim has once traveled to Cyprus in this regard.

On the same day, six persons in groups of two approached Mehdi Khoshhal, Bahman Rastgoo and Mrs. Nadereh Afshari in three German cities, Cologne, Wiesbaden and Hannover and asked about the contacts and the circulation of Peyvand publication, how it was financed, etc. In the first week of February, Messrs. Shams Haeri, Mohammad Reza Eskandari and his wife Tahereh Khorrami were subjected to questioning (by the Dutch security service).

Despite warnings by the security services in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Canada, Karim Haqi and his associates in the Netherlands and other countries continue their contact and cooperation with the mullahs’ MOIS.

Exploiting Human Rights Organizations in order

 to Abuse Human Rights

On January 16, 1996, Karim Haqi and 11 other agents of the regime, met with Professor Maurice Copithorne, the UN Special Human Rights Representative, in Geneva, and claimed that they had been tortured and imprisoned by the PMOI. They unsuccessfully tried to convince Prof. Copithorne, who was in charge of monitoring the human rights situation in Iran, to accuse the PMOI, which struggles for freedom and is itself the biggest victim of human rights violations by the mullahs, of human rights abuses! It is common knowledge, moreover, that it is the Iranian regime that has been condemned on numerous occasions by the UN, the European Parliament, and other human rights organs, for its barbaric human rights abuses.

Similarly, as the head of other teams of MOIS agents, Karim Haqi met with Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Watch representative in Germany, the details of which were revealed at that time by the Iranian Resistance and Iranian refugees, through which human rights organizations were made aware of the regime’s plots. Many of the European parliamentarians in various countries who are familiar with MOIS propaganda tactics carried out by Haqi and other agents can testify about them.

Paolo Casaca, co-chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran committee at the European Parliament, in a statement dated November 29, 2006, pointed to the extensive efforts made by the MOIS, through its agents, to conduct a vilifying campaign against the Resistance, and noted (See Attachment 3):

“…Once my efforts on behalf of the resistance movement became public، I began to receive dozens of dubious letters from unknown individuals who claimed to be opposed to the regime، but also criticized the Mojahedin. It did not work. The next stage was somehow more sophisticated. This time it was not the Iranian regime or unknown individuals، but people who claimed to be former members of the organization، whose aim was، to put it bluntly، justifying the crimes committed by the terrorist regime ruling Iran.

“I also received some very slick booklets that had the appearance of being published by genuine cultural associations. But، after reading through them، I could easily discern that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was hiding behind all the glossy pages. I have gone through all the allegations such as "terrorism،" "attacking civilians،" "imprisonment of dissidents،" "cult-like behavior،" and a great deal more. I have seen no merit in these allegations.

“Karim Haqi has been collaborating with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) since 1995. Haqi operates out of an outfit called "Payvand". His extensive contacts with the MOIS even drew attention from the Dutch internal security service. They interrogated him on several occasions and warned him about his contacts with and receiving money from the MOIS…”

Arranging Legal Cases against the Iranian Resistance

One of the more recent MOIS initiatives in Europe, which Karim Haqi and other agents of the regime have been tasked to carry out, has been to try to form cases against the PMOI and the National Council of Resistance of Iran, by providing misinformation to government officials and intelligence services sympathetic to the mullahs.

Prior to former mullahs’ President Mohammad Khatami’s visit to France in March 2005, the MOIS attempted to gather all its agents from various countries and gather them in the town of Auvers sur-Oise and the surrounding areas northwest of Paris, to pressure and prevent the Iranian Resistance and its sympathizers from organizing a demonstration against Khatami’s visit. The agents’ assembly, which according to Agence France Presse included about 50 MOIS agents, was faced with angry reaction from French residents. French newspapers reported on the mullah agents’ disgraceful assembly and interviewed residents of Auvers sur-Oise (Attachment 4):

Page 14 - L’Écho - Le Régional - mercredi 13 avril 2005

APRES LA MANIFESTATION DES OPPOSANTS

Les Moudjahidins

dénoncent la provocation

La démonstration de l’Iran Payvand Association devant les mairies d’Auvers-sur-Oise et de Méry

a laissé un goût amer aux Moudjahidins et aux habitants acquis à leur cause.

C’est peu de dire que les Moudjahidins du Peuple installés à Auvers-sur-Oise et leurs amis Auversois ou Mérysiens ont peu goûté la manifestation provocatrice du groupe qui s’intitule

Iran Payvand Association, la semaine dernière.

Les uns et les autres ont été indignés de ce qu’ils considèrent comme une grossière intrusion de personnages plus que douteux, sans doute téléguidés par un régime iranien jugé abject, pour lancer des accusations sujettes à caution.

Un panneau calicot a particulièrement indigné, à juste titre. On y voit des photographies de sympathisants des Moudjahidins s’immolant par le feu, voici deux ans, après l’opération de police. Et comme seule légende « Bruguière, héros de la lutte contre le terrorisme ». Un manque d’humanité élémentaire qui ne peut que provoquer le mépris.

L’affaire Zahra Kazemi

Mais sans doute les partisans des mollahs n’en sont pas à une monstruosité près. Il suffit de se rappeler le sort de la journaliste irano-canadienne Zahra Kazemi, après son arrestation en juin 2003 pour avoir photographié une prison iranienne et morte quatre jours plus tard. Les autorités de Téhéran ont toujours refusé de rendre son corps à sa famille, et pour cause. Selon un médecin iranien, Shahram Aazam, qui avait pu voir son cadavre, elle avait le nez fracturé, le crâne fendu, des doigts cassés, les ongles arrachés, un orteil « en bouillie » et le vagin « complètement lacéré » à la suite d’un « viol brutal », peut-être avec un morceau de bois. Un traitement que les mollahs ont sans doute trouvé « normal » puisque le régime des mollahs a acquitté le principal suspect de ces tortures et attribué la mort de Zahra à un « malaise » ! Que les trublions qui ont manifesté à Auvers aient proclamé «vive le juge Bruguière» ne peut qu’interpeller la conscience civique et morale des Français. Certains se sont étonnés que l’ةcho donne la semaine dernière la parole à M. Karim Haggi, le peu reluisant leader du groupe de manifestants anti-Moudjahidin. Mais c’est précisément l’honneur de notre journal de donner la parole à chacun, contrairement à ce qui se fait en Iran. Ce qui justifie de revenir sur cette affaire pour apporter notre point de vue et celui des Auversois.

La parole à chacun

les Moudjahidins du peuple d’Auvers-sur-Oise ne sont pas les moins indignés. Leur porte-parole, Aladdin Touran, a tenu à répondre aux graves accusations contre la Résistance iranienne : « Ce qui s’est passé le 1er avril fait partie d’une campagne de désinformation menée par le ministère iranien des renseignements. Exaspérés et dépités par l’ampleur du soutien que les Français et surtout les Valdoisiens apportent à la Résistance iranienne et à Madame Radjavi, présidente de la République élue par cette résistance, les mollahs en Iran ont essayé de fomenter des troubles dans la région tout en cherchant à diaboliser la Résistance ».

Fomenter des troubles

Comme par hasard, 15 mars 2005, le mollah Ali Younessi, ministre des renseignements, qui dirige cette campagne, avait annoncé : « J’ai donné l’ordre de porter à la connaissance de toutes les instances internationales et dans les plus brefs délais, les crimes commis par les Modjahedines." Aladdin Touran nous raconte la suite : « Auparavant, en réponse aux demandes formulées par Téhéran pour exercer des pressions contre la Résistance iranienne, un service français avait rétorqué qu’étant donné la popularité de ce mouvement en France, il faudrait réunir un nombre important d’Iraniens à Auvers-sur Oise pour afficher une opposition à la Résistance. C’est alors que l’on pourra sous prétexte d’atteinte à

l’ordre publique, augmenter la pression sur les Iraniens d’Auvers. Mais la campagne s’est soldée par un échec total et les mollahs n’ont pu rassembler qu’une cinquantaine de leurs agents, bien connus, à Auvers-sur-Oise. Certains venaient de l’ambassade du régime en France, d’autres arrivaient d’Iran et le reste de divers pays d’Europe comme l’Allemagne, les Pays-Bas, la Suède, la Norvège, l’Angleterre

ou la Suisse. Ils sont abhorrés par les Iraniens pour leur collaboration avec la dictature. Pas même un seul Iranien résidant en France ne se trouvait parmi eux, bien qu’ils soient des milliers à habiter dans

l’Hexagone. »

Manipulation

Selon les Moudjahidins d’Auvers, l’association hollandaise Iran Payvand, organisatrice de la «manifestation», est liée au ministère des renseignements de Téhéran. Selon sa revue, « Payvand », au moins dix individus parmi ceux venus à Auvers le 1er avril ont été questionnés par les services hollandais, allemands, anglais, norvégiens, et autres en raison de leurs relations avec les services iraniens. Selon Peyvand, la police hollandaise a affirmé à Karim Haggi, le président de ladite association : « Nous disposons

de documents suffisants pour démontrer que vous êtes en relation avec le régime iranien qui vous paye, entre autres, les frais de cette revue. »

Sans commentaires...

Jean-François DUPAQUIER

Several members of the Paris bar association also released a statement in Paris, which condemned the MOIS agent gathering in Auvers sur-Oise, and revealed the gathering’s links with the mullahs’ MOIS (Attachment 5):

…Aujourd’hui, 1^er avril 2005, d’informations concordantes et recoupées, il semble que des agents des services secrets iraniens aient décidé d’être présents dans la zone d’Auvers-sur-Oise pour y mener des actions inconnues mais dont l’objectif ne peut être que de discréditer le CNRI, voire de donner de la consistance à la criminalisation dont ils sont artificiellement l’objet.

Ils mettent en garde les autorités françaises sur toutes formes de complaisance qui pourraient conduire à favoriser des comportements dont le seul objet est de tenter de créer, par la provocation, des troubles à l’ordre public.

Les Avocats des Membres du CNRI rappellent que ce sont ces mêmes services secrets iraniens qui « recrutent » des anciens membres de l’organisation pour les transformer en témoins providentiels pour les Magistrats Instructeurs…

Supporting the Mullahs’ Criminal President Ahmadinejad

Subsequent to the failed plot of the mullahs in Paris, the MOIS attempted to set things aright by organizing a meeting against the Iranian Resistance at a building affiliated with the British House of Commons. The meeting was cancelled due to extensive protests on the part of representatives from both houses as well as human rights activists. Lord Robin Corbett, chairman of the British parliamentary committee for Iran Freedom, said in a statement issued on November 9, 2005:

“The British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom has been informed that known agents of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry known as Iran Interlink, a suspected group related to the mullahs’ regime, are supposed to have a conference on November 10, 2005 in Fielden House in Westminster.  These people have been dispatched to justify the Iranian regime President’s remarks inciting terrorism … It is unbelievable that those who use terror inside the country and incite it outside the country, think that any sane person would listen to them…Their hysteric accusations about the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran is indicative of the success of the Iranian resistance in revealing nuclear deception of the mullahs, their responsibility for killing British military forces in Iraq and increasing human rights abuses."

Failing to set up their meeting at the building affiliated with the House of Commons, the mullah regime’s agents gathered in a hotel in London to continue to propagate MOIS lies and accusations against the Resistance.

Despite various statements and invitations by the MOIS for this meeting, not even a single British citizen, politician, journalist, nor even Emma Nicholson, or anyone from the Netherlands, showed up at the meeting. Karim Haqi, Massoud Khodabandeh, and Anne Singleton (Khodabandeh), were the only organizers of this event.

Extremely angered by the disgraceful failure, Haqi began to defend and support the mullahs’ President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He said, “Ahmadinejad talks with courage and honesty. The threat from the PMOI is more than the nuclear threat of the regime.”

“Peace and Solidarity” Demonstration in Support

 of the Regime’s Nuclear Program

Recently, subsequent to the blacklisting of the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and other organs as terrorists and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction by the United States, and in the midst of the adoption of a third round of sanctions at the UN Security Council against the mullahs’ nuclear program, Karim Haqi continues his activities under the banner of “global peace movement.” Haqi, along with the regime’s other agents and lobbies in countries like the Netherlands, Germany, and France, is active in setting up superficial events in France. These events are organized by the regime through its front associations with the aim of supporting the mullahs’ nuclear projects, and also opposing the more decisive policies of the new French government vis-à-vis the adventurism of the mullahs’ regime. For example, on October 27, 2007, Haqi and Javad Firouzmand headed a so-called demonstration, which took place after a month-and-a-half-long MOIS-run campaign in France to support the regime’s nuclear program under the banner of “Peace, Solidarity, and Opposing War.” This demonstration failed miserably. Voice of America TV (October 27, 2007) reported that only 11 people had attended the so-called demonstration! The regime’s embassy employees and MOIS agents who had attended the “demonstration,” began to leave the scene in shame.

The intelligence centre of the regime’s embassy, which had organized the above protest, could only take well-known MOIS agents from various countries to the scene. These agents included: Karim Haqi from the Netherlands; Javad Firouzmand and Jahangir Shadanlou from France; Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, Ali-Akbar Rastgou, Amir Movassaqi, Ali Qashqavi, and Abbas Sadeqinejad from Germany; Termadoyan from Switzerland, and 2 agents from the regime’s embassy and MOIS in France (See Attachment 6).

Iranian Refugees in the Netherlands Demand

 the Expulsion of Regime Agents

The activities of Karim Haqi, Shams Haeri, Massoud Jabani, and Habib Khorrami, in the guise of refugees and opposition activists, against the true Iranian dissidents and political refugees, and the main opposition in the Netherlands, have provoked hatred among Iranian refugees. They have, on many occasions, complained about the spying activities of Karim Haqi to the French police.

Last year, 150 Iranian political refugees wrote a letter to the Dutch Prime Minister requesting the expulsion of the MOIS agents and spies from the Netherlands. They wrote in their letter:

“Your Excellency Mr. Balkenende,

Prime Minister of the Netherlands

We, as Iranian refugees in the Netherlands, request from the Dutch government to expel the Iranian regime’s spies from Dutch territory.

Recently, the regime’s agents in the Netherlands have gathered personal information about political refugees and sent them to the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Subsequently, the MOIS began to contact our families in Iran, and through intimidation tactics and threats, it tried to make us return to Iran. We have left our country due to this regime’s suppressive policies and are now considered Dutch citizens …

We have learnt that the Nejat association, which is linked to the mullahs’ infamous MOIS, resorted to sending greeting cards and books to us, by using our personal contact information it received from the regime’s spies in the Netherlands.

Therefore, we, the Iranian refugees in the Netherlands, cannot feel safe, and request that these well-known mullah agents be expelled immediately. Some of these agents include:

1.           Ahmad Shams Haeri

2.           Karim Haqi Moni

3.           Habib Khorrami

4.           Masoud Jabani

This letter is signed by 150 Iranian refugees residing in the Netherlands and is being sent to the Dutch Prime Minister. Iranians residing in the Netherlands, like millions of other Iranian refugees around the world, demand the expulsion of the mullah regime’s agents from their places of residency. This is because the spying activities of these agents under the direction of the regime’s embassies and MOIS, leads to the endangerment of the lives of Iranian refugees.”

In response to the political refugees’ representative, the director of the Middle East and North Africa desk at the Dutch Foreign Ministry confirmed the receipt of their letter about the spying activities of the regime’s agents in the Netherlands, and stressed that the letter had been handed over to responsible authorities.

“…I received your letter to the Dutch Foreign Minister on behalf of 150 Iranian refugees residing in the Netherlands, through which you expressed concern about the Iranian regime’s intelligence services, and as you said, the regime’s spying activities in the Netherlands. I have submitted your letter to the relevant officials.

Sincerely,

Director of the Middle East and North Africa desk”

European Union Council of Ministers on April 29, 1997 stressed on the “cooperation among European governments to guarantee that no visas are issued to Iranians with intelligence and security missions,” and called on all member states to “adopt coordinated measures for deporting and preventing MOIS personnel to enter European countries.”